

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001723

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2012

TAGS: [IT](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [NATO](#) [MEPPIT](#) [NATO](#) [MEPP](#)

SUBJECT: READOUT OF BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT

REF: STATE 43835

CLASSIFIED BY: POL MC TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON:1.5 (B)(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 01723 01 OF 02 051649Z

1. (C) ON APRIL 5, PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI'S SENIOR DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA, TOLD POLMINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN THAT THE APRIL 2-3 BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT WAS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL RUSSIA-ITALY BILATERAL MEETING EVER HELD. PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI HIS DESIRE TO ENHANCE AND EXPAND UPON THE "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. NEXT TO GERMANY, ITALY IS RUSSIA'S MAIN TRADING PARTNER, AND PUTIN WANTS TO USE GERMANY AND ITALY AS HIS MAIN CONNECTION TO AND SUPPORT IN THE EU. AN INDICATION OF THE SPECIAL PLACE ITALY HOLDS IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IS THE FACT THAT BERLUSCONI IS THE FIRST FOREIGN LEADER TO BE INVITED TO PUTIN'S DACHA IN SOCHI, WHERE THE FIRST DAY'S MEETINGS WERE CONDUCTED. ON APRIL 3 THE SUMMIT SHIFTED TO MOSCOW, AND BERLUSCONI WAS JOINED BY THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE, INTERIOR, PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, AND CULTURAL HERITAGE. THE SECOND DAY WAS CUT SHORT BY THE EMERGENCY EU FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG.

2. (C) CASTELLANETA TEMPERED BERLUSCONI'S VERY POSITIVE PUBLIC COMMENTS ON RUSSIA'S EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU AND EVEN NATO BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE PM WAS REFERRING TO THE VERY LONG TERM. BERLUSCONI DOES SEE ROOM FOR QUICKER MOVEMENT IN THE MEDIUM TERM, THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE. THIS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE EU EXPANDS TO INCLUDE POLAND AND THE BALTICS, ENVELOPING KALININGRAD IN THE PROCESS.

-----  
NATO-RUSSIA  
-----

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 01723 01 OF 02 051649Z

3. (C) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN CALLED PRESIDENT BUSH DURING BERLUSCONI'S VISIT, AND DISCUSSED HIS DESIRE FOR ACCELERATED NATO-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS, CULMINATING IN A TREATY TO BE SIGNED IN ROME ON MAY 29. THE CHOICE OF DATE WAS BASED ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRAVEL TO RUSSIA 23-26 MAY, AND PUTIN'S REQUIREMENT TO BE IN MOSCOW ON MAY 28 FOR THE RUSSIA-EU SUMMIT. FOR THIS TIMING TO WORK, ADDED CASTELLANETA, THE DOCUMENT NEEDS TO BE IN FINAL FORM FOR FMS TO APPROVE IN REYKJAVIK ON MAY 15.

4. (C) CASTELLANETA SAID THAT PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO GO TO THE NOVEMBER NATO SUMMIT IN PRAGUE "AS THINGS ARE TODAY." CASTELLANETA SAID THAT A NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT IN ROME WOULD HELP PUTIN TO JUSTIFY HIS PRESENCE IN PRAGUE. (SEPTTEL REPORTS RELATED CONVERSATION BERLUSCONI HAD WITH AMBASSADOR SEMBLER WHEN THE FORMER RETURNED FROM MOSCOW).

----  
MEPP  
----

5. (C) BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN SHARE PRESIDENT BUSH'S POSITION ON THE NEED FOR A MEDIATED PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. PUTIN IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO TREAD CAREFULLY AND AVOID PUSHING ISRAEL TO THE WALL, AND WANTS TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, AS DOES BERLUSCONI.

-----  
IRAN/IRAQ  
-----

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ROME 01723 01 OF 02 051649Z

6. (C) CASTELLANETA SAID THAT BERLUSCONI, AS REQUESTED BY PRESIDENT BUSH (REFTTEL), CARRIED THE U.S. MESSAGE OF CONCERN REGARDING WMD, STRESSING THE GOI WAS WORRIED THAT THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM RUSSIA TO IRAN WAS AIDING IRAN'S ATTEMPTS TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BERLUSCONI EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOI HAD INFORMATION (WITHOUT NAMING THE SOURCE) THAT IRAN HAD AN ACTIVE PROGRAM TO DEVELOP BOTH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES. PUTIN DISMISSED

THESE CONCERNS, ASSURING BERLUSCONI THAT RUSSIA SOLD ONLY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO IRAN, AND SAID THAT THERE WERE STRICT CONTROLS ON ALL DUAL-USE AND NON-CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES. PUTIN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO SELL SUCH CAPABILITIES TO IRAN, WHEN RUSSIA ITSELF COULD BE THE FIRST TARGET.

17. (C) PUTIN EXPRESSED TO BERLUSCONI HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ, NOTING THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO BE ABLE TO COLLECT ON IRAQ'S HEAVY BILATERAL DEBT. PUTIN STRESSED THE NEED TO USE THE UN TO DEAL WITH IRAQ.

-----  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3519

PAGE 01 ROME 01723 02 OF 02 051649Z  
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DS-00	OIGO-00	FBIE-00
	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	VCE-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	PM-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	SAS-00	/003W				

-----7FBC4A 051649Z /38

O 051600Z APR 02  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3127  
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001723

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2012  
TAGS: [IT PREL](#) [RS PREL](#) [RS NATO](#) [MEPPIT](#) [NATO](#) [MEPP](#)  
SUBJECT: READOUT OF BERLUSCONI-PUTIN SUMMIT

BALKANS  
-----

18. (C) PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT THE CAPABILITY OF RUSSIA TO COOPERATE WITH THE ESDP PROCESS WOULD REMAIN LIMITED  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 01723 02 OF 02 051649Z  
BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS TAKING KOSOVO IN A DIRECTION THAT RUSSIA CAN'T ACCEPT. ACCORDING TO PUTIN, THIS IS THE MAIN REASON THAT RUSSIA WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ITS TROOPS COMMITTED TO KOSOVO.

-----  
AFGHANISTAN  
-----

19. (C) PUTIN REITERATED TO BERLUSCONI HIS SUPPORT FOR THE OEF ALLIANCE'S GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WOULD NOT COMMIT RUSSIAN TROOPS TO THE EFFORT. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT, GIVEN THE SOPHISTICATION OF U.S. WEAPONS ALREADY USED IN AFGHANISTAN, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-----  
WARHEAD REDUCTION  
-----

110. (C) PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT NUCLEAR WARHEAD REDUCTION TALKS WITH THE U.S. WERE CLOSE TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. ONE AREA OF CONCERN FOR THE RUSSIANS IS THE U.S. PREFERENCE TO STOCKPILE, RATHER THAN DESTROY, THE EXCESS WARHEADS. PUTIN CITED THE HIGH COST OF STORING WARHEADS, BUT SAID THAT IF THE U.S. INSISTS, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO ALONG.

-----  
DEBT  
-----

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 01723 02 OF 02 051649Z

111. (C) PUTIN TOLD BERLUSCONI THAT HE WELCOMED THE IDEA OF "TEN PLUS TEN OVER TEN". PUTIN WOULD PREFER, HOWEVER, THAT THE DENOMINATOR OF THE EQUATION BE REDUCED TO FIVE YEARS. CASTELLANETA TOLD COUNTRYMAN THAT ITALY SUPPORTS THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WOULD PREFER A RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM, RATHER THAN USING NEW MONEY AS PROPOSED BY GERMANY. THE G-8 HAS TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE. PUTIN ASKED BERLUSCONI TO CONSIDER DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA'S DEBT TO ITALY.

NOTE: RUSSIAN DEBT TO ITALY, APPROXIMATELY 9.2 BILLION, IS  
SECOND ONLY TO ITS DEBT TO GERMANY. OF THAT AMOUNT, NEARLY  
USD 7.6 BILLION IS SOVIET-ERA DEBT.  
SEMBLER

CONFIDENTIAL

>

2002ROME01723 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL